Nurse Malpractice in North Carolina: The Standard of Care by Armstrong, Elizabeth J.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 65 | Number 3 Article 5
3-1-1987
Nurse Malpractice in North Carolina: The
Standard of Care
Elizabeth J. Armstrong
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth J. Armstrong, Nurse Malpractice in North Carolina: The Standard of Care, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 579 (1987).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol65/iss3/5
NOTES
Nurse Malpractice in North Carolina: The Standard of Care
Contemporary nurses work in a wide variety of settings and provide many
levels of health care. For example, the intensive care nurse, titrating potent
vasoactive drugs and measuring intra-arterial pressures, cares for the critically
ill patient; the school nurse, screening school children for scoliosis, works to-
ward early detection and treatment. Nurses can be found taking care of patients
and teaching people how to maintain and improve their health all along the
spectrum of the health care system. Given the diversity of roles that nurses
fulfill, how is their performance evaluated in the context of a malpractice trial?
This Note examines North Carolina law relating to the standard of care required
of a professional nurse. It discusses when and whether expert testimony is nec-
essary to establish the standard as well as who qualifies as an expert. Issues of
professional vulnerability are discussed, including the standard of care for nurses
in expanded roles and the latitude of nurses to obey or disobey physicians' or-
ders. Finally, the Note addresses the standard's "same or similar" community
requirement. The Note concludes that various changes should be made in the
way North Carolina courts determine the nursing standard of care. These
changes are necessary to ensure that nurses are held accountable for their profes-
sional expertise and education, but protected from liability for a standard of care
that they have not assumed.
For the purposes of this Note, a professional nurse is a registered nurse who
is licensed under state law to practice nursing, including registered nurses prac-
ticing in expanded roles.' There are presently three routes of educational prepa-
ration available for those desiring to become registered nurses: baccalaureate, 2
diploma, 3 and associate degree4 programs. The American Nurses' Association5
has recommended adoption of the baccalaureate degree as the required educa-
1. Expanded nursing roles refer to positions such as nurse practitioners, nurse anesthetists,
and clinical nurse specialists. The hallmark of these positions is increased responsibility and speciali-
zation. See A. RHODES & R. MILLER, NURSING AND THE LAW 101-02 (4th ed. 1984).
2. In baccalaureate programs student nurses typically study humanities and science courses
for two years, followed by two or three years of clinical and theoretical instruction in nursing.
COUNCIL OF STATE BDS. OF NURSING, AM. NURSES' Ass'N, EXAMINING THE VALIDITY OF THE
STATE BOARD TEST POOL EXAMINATION FOR REGISTERED NURSE LICENSURE 7 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter COUNCIL].
3. Diploma degree programs usually are two or three years long and are conducted by hospi-
tals. Id.
4. Associate degree programs usually require two years and are offered by community or jun-
ior colleges. Id.
5. The American Nurses' Association (ANA), a professional organization for registered
nurses, is a federation of constituent state nurses' associations. There are state nurses' associations in
all 50 states; any registered nurse may join a state association. The goals of ANA include fostering
high standards of nursing care and promoting the professional development of nurses. AM. NURSES'
ASS'N, FACTS ABOUT NURSING 82-83, at 366 (1983).
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tion for registered nurses;6 however, at present any of the three programs is
sufficient to qualify the nurse to sit for the registered nurse licensing
examination. 7
The more generic term "nurse" refers to a licensed practical nurse or a
registered nurse. In older cases, however, the term may refer to any person
practicing nursing. Prior to 1903 use of the title "nurse" or "registered nurse"
was not regulated in any state. 8 Licensed practical nurses also are examined and
licensed by state boards of nursing;9 the usual educational preparation is one
year of classroom instruction and clinical training.10
Certain nursing care tasks may be delegated to unlicensed assistants. These
nurses' aides work under a nurse's supervision and perform such functions as
bathing, turning, and feeding patients. Although not found in all settings,
nurses' aides are prevalent in settings demanding relatively unskilled care, such
as nursing homes.
Even though the standard of care for a professional nurse in a malpractice
case has its basis in common law, in North Carolina there is also a statute ad-
dressing the standard of care for health care providers. As in any negligence
case, I I the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must offer evidence of the stan-
dard of care, a breach of that standard, proximate causation, and damages. 12
The North Carolina General Assembly has defined the standard of care required
of health care providers in North Carolina General Statutes section 90-21.12, as
follows:
In any action for damages for personal injury or death arising out of
the furnishing or the failure to furnish professional services in the per-
formance of medical, dental, or other health care, the defendant shall
not be liable for the payment of damages unless the trier of the facts is
satisfied by the greater weight of the evidence that the care of such
health care provider was not in accordance with the standards of prac-
tice among members of the same health care profession with similar
training and experience situated in the same or similar communities at
the time of the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action.' 3
6. AM. NURSES' ASS'N, COMM'N ON NURSING EDUC., A CASE FOR BACCALAUREATE PREP-
ARATION IN NURSING 10 (1979).
7. "Candidates for the [examination] must have graduated from a state-approved school of
nursing or, in a few cases, must be nearing graduation and have successfully completed specified
nursing courses." COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 6.
8. Note, A Revolution in White-New Approaches in Treating Nurses as Professionals, 30
VAND. L. REV. 839, 840-42 (1977).
9. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-171.19 to .23 (1985) (discussing the North Carolina
Board of Nursing and its role in licensing practical nurses).
10. Beaver, Characteristics of an Educational Program in Practical Nursing, in PRACTICAL
NURSING: CURRICULA AND COMPETENCIES 4 (Nat'l League for Nursing 1980).
11. Malpractice is a subset of negligence, not an entirely different tort. "While any person may
be negligent, only a professional may be liable for malpractice." Morris, The Negligent Nurse-The
Physician and The Hospital, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 109, 110 (1981). Both negligence and malpractice
are used to describe causes of action against nurses. See infra note 97 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the use of the two terms in the nursing context).
12. Makas v. Hillhaven, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 736, 740 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Mitchell v. Parker, 68
N.C. App. 458, 459, 315 S.E.2d 76, 77, disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 760, 321 S.E.2d 141 (1984).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1985).
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By definition persons engaged in the practice of nursing are health care provid-
ers 14 and, therefore, are held to the statutory standard of care.
15
The courts have not interpreted section 90-21.12 as materially altering the
common-law standard of care. 1 6 Rather, courts and commentators view the
general assembly's intent in enacting section 90-21.12 as "merely to conform the
statute more closely to the existing case law applying a 'same or similar commu-
nity' standard of care."' 17 Therefore, one must examine the case law as well as
section 90-21.12 to understand the standard of care to which nurses are held.
Some appreciation for the historical development of American nursing is
necessary to place the case law in proper perspective. That the courts have not
always treated nurses as professionals is understandable in view of the profound
changes that have occurred in nursing during the last century.'
8
Health care during the early to mid-nineteenth century bore little resem-
blance to that available today. Hospitals at that time were places for the poor
who were sick and dying to go, not places to seek cures.19 Conditions were
frequently appalling and in many instances "defied description." 2 0 Surgeons op-
erated without anesthesia and whiskey was the medicine of choice for many
illnesses.21 Nursing in these "pest houses" fell mainly to untrained women who
could find no other work;2 2 the poor, the illiterate, and the criminal represented
the nurses of the time.23 Religious orders devoted to caring for the sick, how-
ever, were an exception to this rule. For example, Elizabeth Seton established
the Sisters of Charity as a nursing order in Maryland in 1809.24
News of Florence Nightingale's pioneering work during the Crimean War2 S
14. Id. § 90-21.11. The statutory definition of health care providers includes anyone licensed,
registered, or certified to engage in the practice of nursing, "or [who] otherwise performs duties
associated with" nursing. Id.
15. See Page v. Wilson Memorial Hosp., Inc., 49 N.C. App. 533, 535, 272 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1980).
16. See Makas v. Hillhaven, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 736, 740 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Wall v. Stout, 310
N.C. 184, 191-92, 311 S.E.2d 571, 576 (1984).
17. Wall, 310 N.C. at 192, 311 S.E.2d at 576; see also Byrd, The North Carolina Medical Mal-
practice Statute, 62 N.C.L. REy. 711, 741 (1984) ("The statute cannot be divorced from the common
law it codifies and viewed as an exclusive statement of malpractice liability law."); Comment, Statu-
tory Standard of Care for North Carolina Health Care Providers, I CAMPBELL L. REV. 111, 113
(1981) (noting the relationship between the statute and prior case law).
18. See Note, supra note 8, at 842 (discussing the dramatic changes that took place in the
nursing profession from the early 1900s to the mid-1970s).
19. P. KALISCH & B. KALISCH, THE ADVANCE OF AMERICAN NURSING 20-24 (1978) [herein-
after KALISCH]; see also Dellinger, A History of Hospitals in North Carolina, in HOSPITAL LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA (U.N.C. Inst. of Gov't 1985) (detailing the history of hospital development in
North Carolina).
20. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 24; see also id. at 28 (detailing the unsanitary conditions of
hospitals in the early 19th century).
21. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 24-25. "Physicians were so inadequately trained that they often
aggravated rather than alleviated disease. Emetics, purgatives, and bleeding remained the three
mainstays among the therapeutic treatments of the typical mid-century practitioner." Id. at 25.
22. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 28.
23. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 28. In New York City women arrested for public drunkenness
or disorderly conduct could avoid a sentence in the workhouse if they provided nursing service in
local hospital wards. Id. at 79.
24. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 31.
25. In 1854 Nightingale accompanied 38 women of varied nursing experience to Scutari, Tur-
key to care for British casualties of the Crimean War. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 35-37. Despite
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inspired many "respectable" American women to nurse the casualties during the
Civil War, particularly in the North. 26 Training was not necessary, so long as
the nurse was plain in appearance, over thirty years old, and possessed "[g]ood
morals and common sense."'27 As a result, the American public began to accept
nursing as work suitable for respectable women, although education still was not
considered necessary to a nurse. 28
Even before the Civil War, a movement had begun to establish schools for
training nurses.29 After the Civil War, however, the need for trained nurses
clearly was recognized. 30 The hours were long,31 the work menial,32 and the
education minimal3 3 in these early schools. Student nurses provided cheap labor
for hospitals, and a training school came to be considered indispensable to hospi-
tals.34 As the number of training schools multiplied,35 the military and religious
origins of nursing influenced the developing profession: "[A]sceticism, duty,
and the adherence to authority" were required of trained nurses.3 6 Societal sex-
ism 37 and the paternalism of male physicians38 influenced the developing profes-
the opposition of military physicians, Nightingale reorganized the military hospital and instituted
hygienic and nutritional improvements. Id. at 40. By the end of the war Nightingale had supervised
125 nurses, the mortality rate at the Barracks Hospital had dropped from 60% to slightly more than
1%, and a new era of nursing had begun. Id. at 42.
26. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 68. See generally id. at 49-68 (discussing the role of female
nurses during the Civil War).
27. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 51. These were the qualities necessary to join the Union female
nursing corps headed by Dorothea Dix. Id.
28. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 68.
29. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 77.
30. Physicians were the first to recognize the need for trained nurses. KALISCH, supra note 19,
at 81. This recognition was followed by public acceptance of and popular demand for trained nurses.
Id. at 82-84. See generally id. at 71-88 (discussing the development of nurse training programs in the
United States during the 1860s and 1870s).
31. Students routinely worked 10-12 hours a day, 7 days a week, in addition to attending lec-
tures and compulsory church services. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 156-57.
32. A beginning nursing student dusted, scrubbed, washed dishes, cleaned windows, laundered
bandages, and did whatever else needed to be done in the hospital. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 154-
56.
33. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 157. "Despite the ratio of more than 98 percent service to less
than 2 percent theory in school of nursing curricula, physicians constantly complained that nurses
were being overtrained." Id. at 163.
34. J. ASHLEY, HOSPITALS, PATERNALISM, AND THE ROLE OF THE NURSE 11 (1976); KA-
LISCH, supra note 19, at 163. "There was.., no question that hospitals had exploited student nurses
in an attempt to avoid the expense required in employing graduate nurses." Id. at 350 (discussing
the status of nurse education in the late 1920s).
35. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 163. Between 1880 and 1900 the number of schools increased
from 15 to 432. Id. By 1927 there were 2286 schools. Id. at 350.
36. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 163.
37. One commentator has noted:
Nursing, perhaps more than any other profession, has been influenced by social concep-
tions regarding the nature of women. Modem nursing originated at a time when Victorian
ideals dictated that the role of women was to serve men's needs and convenience. Nurs-
ing's development continued to be greatly influenced by the attitudes that women were less
independent, less capable of initiative, and less creative than men, and thus needed mascu-
line guidance.
J. AsutLaY, supra note 34, at 75-76.
38. The hospital training schools provided physicians with ample opportunity to exercise con-
trol over nurses. Physicians favored training over education for nurses and were fond of the maxim
"A good nurse is born, not made." J. ASHLEY, supra note 34, at 77 (quoting William Alexander
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sion tremendously. By the late 1920s training of nurses had evolved into an
apprenticeship system, emphasizing training rather than education.
3 9
A case from this general time period illustrates the status of nursing in the
early twentieth century. In Byrd v. Marion General Hospital4 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court described the duty that a nurse owes to a patient: (1) that
the nurse "possess the requisite degree of learning, skill, and ability necessary to
the practice of [his or her] profession, and which others similarly situated ordi-
narily possess"; (2) that the nurse "exercise reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence in the use of [his or her] skill and in the application of [his or her]
knowledge to the patient's case"; and (3) that the nurse "exert [his or her] best
judgment in the treatment and care of the case."'4 1
This description of the nurse's duty is unobjectionable-indeed it is identi-
cal to the duty owed by a physician as described in Byrd4 2 -- and it represents
the starting point for describing the standard of care for nurses under North
Carolina case law. The court went on, however, to state that the nurse "must
obey and diligently execute" the orders of a physician, 43 because "the physician
is solely responsible for the diagnosis and treatment of his patient. Nurses are
not supposed to be experts in the technique of diagnosis or the mechanics of
treatment." 44 The court, in dictum, did allow that if an order was "so obviously
negligent as to lead any reasonable person to anticipate that substantial injury
would result," a nurse should disobey the order.4 5 "Certainly, if a physician or
surgeon should order a nurse to stick fire to a patient, no nurse would be pro-
tected from liability" for carrying out the order.
46
The Byrd decision illustrates two important aspects of early twentieth cen-
tury nursing. First, the nurse who disobeyed a physician's order was excused
only if the order was so negligent that an ordinary person would realize its dan-
ger-for example, if the nurse were ordered to "stick fire" to the patient. If, by
virtue of knowledge and experience the nurse realized a danger that an ordinary
person would not realize, the duty to follow the order would remain. This duty
of obedience was consistent with the attitude at the time that education was not
necessary and, in fact, could be harmful in a nurse. 47 Second, the quality of
nursing education at that time varied so widely that it was probably in the pa-
tient's best interests to restrict the nurse's judgment regarding physicians' or-
Dorland in an address given to the 1908 graduating class of the Philadelphia School of Nursing).
"'Womanly' qualities on the part of the nurse were valued more than knowledge." Id. at 76.
39. KALISCH, supra note 19, at 350.
40. 202 N.C. 337, 162 S.E. 738 (1932). Plaintiff in Byrd sought to hold a nurse personally liable
for the burns suffered by plaintiff during a "sweat cabinet" treatment. Id. at 338-40, 162 S.E. at 738-
39. A verdict for plaintiff was reversed and defendant's motion for nonsuit granted. Id. at 344, 162
S.E. at 741.
41. Id. at 341, 162 S.E. at 740 (quoting Pangle v. Appalachian Hall, 190 N.C. 833, 835, 131
S.E. 42, 43 (1925)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 342, 162 S.E. at 740.
45. Id. at 341, 162 S.E. at 740.
46. Id.
47. J. AsHLEY, supra note 34, at 76-77.
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ders.48 In many instances, despite being a "trained nurse," the individual might
actually have received very little education on which to base a judgment of an
order;49 therefore, a "reasonably prudent person" standard may have been ap-
propriate in the earlier part of the century.
Finally, the Byrd decision laid the foundation for nursing negligence or
malpractice cases by stating that the nurse owed a duty directly to the patient.
That the nurse also owes a duty to the hospital that employs him or her,5 0 and
to the physician who he or she assists5 l sometimes puts the nurse in a dilemma;
the duties owed to patient, physician, and hospital often conflict.5 2
Byrd has been described as holding that "between patient and nurse, the
nurse who follows the orders of the physician or surgeon in charge is not ordina-
rily liable if injury results from the treatment as prescribed."'53 This is a sound
policy, because even by today's standards nurses are not responsible for diagno-
sis and prescription of medications and certain therapies.5 4 As between physi-
cian and nurse, doctors are primarily responsible for diagnosis and prescription
and, therefore, should bear legal liability for their orders. As between nurse and
layperson, however, the nurse is eminently more qualified to question a physi-
48. If the nurse received his or her training at a hospital, "the training... was entirely depen-
dent upon the kind and quality of medical services provided by the individual hospital and the
amount of attention its administration gave to its apprentice nurses." J. ASHLEY, supra note 34, at
11. By the 1920s it was possible to earn a nursing diploma and a bachelor of science degree in a
university program. However, hospitals remained the chief means of training nurses. KALISCH,
supra note 19, at 337-38. In contrast to the university level of education, many hospitals required
neither a high school diploma nor any high school preparation whatsoever. Id. at 347.
49. KAIiSCH, supra note 19, at 348-50. Although North Carolina did have a nurse registration
act at the time Byrd was decided, it is unclear whether defendant nurse in Byrd was registered. The
early North Carolina statute protected the title of "registered nurse," but did not regulate the scope
of nursing practice. See Bullough, The Current Phase in the Development of Nurse Practice Acts, 28
ST. Louis U.L.J. 365, 369-71 (1984) (discussing the early history of nurse registration acts). "The
older nursing laws made it illegal for an unauthorized person to use the title 'registered nurse,' but
not illegal for such a person to practice nursing." Id. at 372-73.
50. Of course, not all nurses are employed by hospitals. Neither is it reasonable to believe that
nurses working outside hospitals never commit negligent acts. However, many nurse malpractice
cases do involve hospital nurses, probably because the doctrine of respondeat superior allows the
plaintiff to recover from the hospital based on the employee nurses' negligence. This provides the
plaintiff with a "deep pocket" from which he or she can recover damages. For a discussion of
hospital liability for employee nurses' negligence, see 1 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 16A.02. (1986).
51. Morris, supra note 11, at 109.
52. See Comment, Nurses' Legal Dilemma: When Hospital Staffing Compromises Professional
Standards, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 109, 121 (1983) ("The unhappy, but inevitable, result of the disaccord
between a nurse's professional and legal standards and the realities of an understaffed hospital is
increased exposure to liability for the nurse."). In Fincke v. Peeples, 476 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985), testimony that recovery room nursing staff had complained to the head of the anesthesi-
ology department about a physician's tendency to extubate (remove the tube that allows the patient
to breathe while unconscious) patients too quickly after surgery was not admissible as evidence of
prior circumstances to show defendant nurse's negligence when the patient suffered cardiac arrest
following extubation. Such testimony was admissible, however, against the hospital on the issue of
punitive damages. Id. at 1323-24. This case illustrates the nurses' conflicting duties owed to patient,
doctor, and hospital.
53. Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N.C. 259, 262, 72 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1952).
54. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-171.20(7)(e) (1985). This provision excludes medical diag-
nosis and prescription from the definition of nursing practice, subject to id. § 90-18.2, which empow-
ers nurse practitioners to prescribe medications and order tests and treatments under the supervision
of a physician.
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cian's order. To hold a nurse only to Byrd's "obvious negligence" standard is to
disregard the nurse's superior knowledge; such disregard violates even the rea-
sonably prudent person standard. 55 The holding in Byrd that the nurse has a
duty to obey physicians' orders unless those orders pose an obvious danger
seems anachronistic.
In the 1985 case of Paris v. Kreitz56 a North Carolina court again had the
opportunity to consider a nurse's duty to obey physicians' orders. Like plaintiff
in Byrd, plaintiff in Paris sought to impose liability on a nurse5 7 who had carried
out the orders of a physician or a physician assistant. 58 Plaintiff in Paris arrived
at the hospital at 11:40 p.m. complaining of pain in his foot and lower leg. He
was seen by a physician assistant at 1:30 a.m., who noted the same physical signs
and symptoms as had the nurse. The physician assistant diagnosed the problem
as peripheral vascular insufficiency, sent plaintiff home with a pain medication,
and instructed him to see the physician in the morning. The pain increased
during the night; the next day the physician diagnosed an occlusion. Plaintiff
eventually underwent a total of four surgeries, culminating in the loss of his leg.
He alleged that the delay in proper diagnosis and treatment was the proximate
cause of the amputation. Plaintiff further claimed that the nurse in the emer-
gency room knew he required treatment by a trained physician and was negli-
gent in not obtaining treatment for him.
59
The Paris court considered the question of the nurse's negligence under the
Byrd "duty to obey" analysis. Relying on Byrd, the court stated that "[w]hile a
nurse may disobey the instructions of a physician where those instructions are
obviously wrong and will result in harm to the patient .... the duty to disobey
does not extend to situations where there is a difference of medical opinion."
60
Because the nurse's observations agreed with those of the physician assistant,
"[a]ny disagreement or contrary recommendation she may have had as to the
treatment prescribed would have necessarily been premised on a separate diag-
nosis which she was not qualified to render." 61 Although the negligence of the
physician assistant and the physician were questions of fact, "it is clear that the
55. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 185 (W. Keeton, 5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] ("if a person... has knowledge, skill, or even intelligence superior
to that of the ordinary person, the law will demand of that person conduct consistent with it").
56. 75 N.C. App. 365, 331 S.E.2d 234, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 185, 337 S.E.2d 858 (1985).
57. Plaintiff in Paris sought to hold the hospital liable for its employee nurse's alleged negli-
gence in failing to ensure that plaintiff was seen by a physician. Id. at 369-70, 331 S.E.2d at 239.
58. Physician assistants (PAs) are licensed in North Carolina to perform medical acts under the
supervision of a physician. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-18.1 (1985). The usual training requires two
years of intensive study and clinical rotations. The Paris court did not distinguish between a nurse's
duty to obey a PA and the duty to obey a physician. However, the statute notes that "[a]ny regis-
tered nurse or licensed practical nurse who receives an order from a physician assistant for medica-
tions, test, or treatments is authorized to perform that order in the same manner as if it were
received from a licensed physician." Id. § 90-18.1(f).
59. Paris, 75 N.C. App. at 367-70, 331 S.E.2d at 237-40.
60. Id. at 380, 331 S.E.2d at 245 (citations omitted). The court did not distinguish between a
right and a duty to disobey orders. In the quotation cited in the text the court first states that a nurse
"may" disobey an order in certain circumstances, then in the same sentence equates this with a
"duty to disobey." Id.
61. Id. at 381, 331 S.E.2d at 245.
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negligence was not so obvious as to require [defendant nurse] to disobey an in-
struction or refuse to administer a treatment." '62
The Paris court relied on Byrd to describe the nurse's duty to obey a physi-
cian, but failed to specify what standard would apply to a nurse's decision to
obey or disobey an order. The quality and uniformity of nursing education has
improved considerably since Byrd was written;63 nursing practice is defined and
regulated by licensure64 so that patients and physicians can reasonably expect a
professional nurse to use his or her education and experience in judging the
soundness of physicians' orders. The broad language in Paris regarding the
nurse's duty to obey should be restricted to the facts of the case. Those facts did
not present the court with a situation in which a nurse made a reasoned judg-
ment to disobey an order based on observations of the patient. The nurse and
physician assistant were in agreement over the patient's condition. Thus, Paris
should not be interpreted as holding that nurses must obey physicians' orders in
the absence of obvious negligence, even if the nurse disagrees with the order
based on his or her education and experience. The professional nurse has a right
and a duty to use his or her judgment in carrying out physicians' orders. 65
Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed this issue indirectly. At least
one court has suggested that the nurse may refuse to follow an order if he or she
notifies the physician of the refusal. 66 In another case in which a nurse did not
refuse to carry out an order, but rather exercised judgment in administering a
medication ordered on a "P.R.N." or "as needed" basis, the court noted that
"[w]hile nurses traditionally have followed the instructions of attendant physi-
cians, doctors realistically have long relied on nurses to exercise independent
judgment in many situations." 67 This recognition contrasts with the Paris
court's oversimplified view of nursing judgment, that any disagreement with an
62. Id.
63. "Despite the background of severe obstacles, nursing as a profession has made considerable
progress since mid-century. Nursing has now established standards and national accreditation for
all schools of nursing, controlled by the profession." J. ASHLEY, supra note 34, at 126-27.
64. See Bullough, supra note 49, at 371-76.
65. Courts have long recognized nurses' affirmative duty to question unclear or confusing or-
ders. For example, in Norton v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 144 So. 2d 249 (La. Ct. App. 1962), a nurse was
held responsible for an infant's wrongful death due to an overdose of digitalis. The physician ne-
glected to write the route of administration (oral or by injection); the nurse, rather than clarifying
the route by talking to the ordering physician, administered the dose by injection. Had the medica-
tion been administered orally, as intended, it would have been a normal dosage. Id. at 251-58.
66. See Carlsen v. Javurek, 526 F.2d 202, 208-09 (8th Cir. 1975). With respect to refusing to
obey an order, Rhodes and Miller have noted, "[p]ending review, if the drug or procedure appears
dangerous to the patient, the nurse should decline to carry out the order, but should immediately
notify the ordering physician." A. RHODES & R. MILLER, supra note 1, at 150. They also contend
that "[hlospitals should have established procedures for nurses to follow when they are not satisfied
with the appropriateness of an order." Id.
67. Fraijo v. Hartland Hosp., 99 Cal. App. 3d 331, 342, 160 Cal. Rptr. 246, 252 (1979). The
nurse in FraUo administered Demerol, a pain reliever, to an asthmatic patient complaining of chest
pain. Id. at 338, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 249. The patient subsequently suffered a cardiac arrest. Although
the drug manufacturer's literature warned against giving Demerol during an acute asthmatic attack,
id. at 337, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 249, there was evidence that it is still used with asthmatics to combat
pain, id. at 337 n.5, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 249 n.5, and that the drug was not the cause of the cardiac
arrest. Id. at 339, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 250. The court held that nurses in situations involving the use of
independent judgment are entitled to the benefit of specific jury instructions usually reserved for
physicians. Id. at 343, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
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order would be based on a separate diagnosis when a nurse agreed with the
physician assistant's observations. 68 Experience does not support the Paris con-
clusion. Many situations can arise in which a nurse and physician make similar
observations, yet the nurse is alerted by his or her experience and education to a
problem with the physician's order. This problem arises frequently in interac-
tions between new interns and experienced nurses.69
The duty to obey physicians' orders is but one of the many issues that may
arise in a nursing malpractice case. How will a defendant nurse's conduct be
evaluated in malpractice cases? General negligence principles demand that
tortfeasors' behavior be measured against an objective standard of behavior.
Generally, this standard is that of the fictitious "reasonably prudent person."'70
If a person possesses superior knowledge or skill, however, the law demands
conduct consistent with that higher level of knowledge. 71 Thus, "[t]he profes-
sional standard of care is in effect a statement of the reasonable care standard
specifically tailored to the professional." 72 The court in Byrd stated the profes-
sional standard expected of a nurse. 73
Because most jury members do not have the background necessary to un-
derstand the medical and technical aspects of a medical malpractice case, expert
testimony usually is required to assist the jury;74 the same is true of many nurse
malpractice cases. Thus, a case at trial proceeds something like the following
example. In Holbrooks v. Duke University, Inc.75 plaintiff alleged that she had
been injured by an injection given to her by a nurse. The nurse had administered
a pain medication by intramuscular injection three to four inches above plain-
tiff's knee.76 A nurse expert testified that giving an injection at that location was
not in accordance with customary practice among professional nurses in Dur-
ham, North Carolina, or similar communities. This testimony, in addition to
physician testimony that the injection could have caused plaintiff's injury, was
sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question of the nurse's negligence. 77
The expert testimony in such cases establishes the customary standard for
professional conduct. Although the customary practice standard does allow the
professional group in effect to set its own standard of conduct, 78 it does not
68. Paris, 75 N.C. App. at 381, 331 S.E.2d at 245.
69. One example would be if an intern ordered a certain drug to counteract nausea following
chemotherapy for treating cancer. The nurse, more experienced in such treatment than the intern,
might recognize the drug ordered as effective for post-anesthetic nausea, yet ineffective in combating
post-chemotherapy nausea. The nurse in this situation would be observing the same symptoms as
the physician, reaching the same conclusion, yet recognizing the ordered treatment as ineffective.
Common sense and compassion for the patient dictate that the nurse notify the physician of the
availability of a more effective medication and seek a revision of the order.
70. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 32, at 173-74.
71. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 32, at 185.
72. Byrd, supra note 17, at 712-13.
73. See supra text accompanying note 41.
74. See Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium & Asheville Agric. School, 234 N.C. 222, 227, 67
S.E.2d 57, 61 (1951) ("both the court and jury must be dependent on expert testimony").
75. 63 N.C. App. 504, 305 S.E.2d 69 (1983).
76. Id. at 505, 305 S.E.2d at 67-70.
77. Id. at 505-06, 305 S.E.2d at 70.
78. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 32, at 189.
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permit the group to say that no customary practice within a profession can be
negligent. Thus, although surgeons universally rely on the operating room
nurses' sponge count to ensure that no sponges are left in the patient's body after
an operation, they are still liable if a sponge is left in the operative site.79
Although the standard of care is defined by section 90-21.12 as "the stan-
dards of practice among members of the same health care profession with simi-
lar training and experience situated in the same or similar communities at the
time of the alleged act giving rise to the cause of action," 80 the case law discloses
that in certain instances the nurse will be held to a nonprofessional standard.
This is true when the alleged act of negligence is one that does not involve pro-
fessional skill or judgment. In such cases the jury is deemed capable of applying
the reasonably prudent person standard and expert testimony is unnecessary. 8 1
In Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium & Asheville Agriculture School82 the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that expert testimony is not required in
every medical malpractice case.8 3 The court noted that expert testimony is usu-
ally needed to provide opinion evidence for the court and jury; "[o]rdinarily
there can be no other guide."'84 There are instances, however, "where non-ex-
pert jurors of ordinary intelligence may draw their own inferences from the facts
and circumstances shown in evidence." 85 One such instance was presented in
Norris v. Rowan Memorial Hospital, Inc.,8 6 in which a seventy-five-year-old wo-
man fell and fractured her hip while in the hospital. Plaintiff's decedent had
been medicated with castor oil and a sleeping pill, and the side rails on her bed
were not raised.87 Plaintiff introduced a bulletin issued by defendant hospital
which stated that bed rails should be raised for elderly and sedated patients; no
expert testimony was offered. 88 The trial court sustained defendant's motion for
a directed verdict. Reversing the trial court, the court of appeals held: "Where,
as here, the alleged breach of duty did not involve the rendering or failure to
render professional nursing or medical services requiring special skills, expert
testimony . . . is not necessary to develop a case of negligence for the jury." 89
The court stated that the nursing staff's failure to raise the bed rails and instruct
the patient to call for assistance to get out of bed was the proximate cause of her
injury. The combination of the laxative and the sleeping pill given the patient
"should have put a reasonably prudent person on notice" that the patient would
have to use the bathroom during the night while still under the effects of the
79. See Truhitte v. French Hosp., 128 Cal. App. 3d 332, 349, 180 Cal. Rptr. 152, 161 (1982)
(sponge removal is nondelegable duty of surgeon).
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1985).
81. See Norris v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 21 N.C. App. 623, 626, 205 S.E.2d 345, 348
(1974). "The Norris case is important because it carefully relates the need for expert testimony to the
particular facts and the jury's ability to understand them." Byrd, supra note 17, at 719.
82. 234 N.C. 222, 67 S.E.2d 57 (1951).
83. Id. at 226-27, 67 S.E.2d at 61-62.
84. Id. at 227, 67 S.E.2d at 61.
85. Id, at 227, 67 S.E.2d at 61-62.
86. 21 N.C. App. 623, 205 S.E.2d 345 (1974).
87. Id. at 623-24, 205 S.E.2d at 346.
88. Id. at 625, 205 S.E.2d at 347.
89. Id. at 626, 205 S.E.2d at 348.
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sleeping pill.90 Thus, a jury could reasonably find the hospital liable for the
negligence of its nursing staff, even without expert testimony.
Similarly, in Biggs v. Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc.9 1 defendant
hospital's employee, a nurses' aide, was considered negligent in failing to assist
plaintiff back to bed following a hot shower. Plaintiff was recovering from back
surgery and two hot showers a day were part of her treatment. Plaintiff offered
opinion evidence by a certified and experienced nurses' aide regarding the appli-
cable practices and standards of care.9 2 The trial court admitted the testimony
over defendant's objections.9 3 On appeal, the court stated that admission of the
testimony was appropriate because the witness "manifestly knew more about the
functions and practices of nurse's aides than the jurors did,"'94 but that the testi-
mony was unnecessary to establish a case for the jury.95 Because Norris in-
volved a nurse, and Biggs involved a nurses' aide, it is clear that it is the alleged
act, not the identity of the actor, that determines whether expert testimony is
required.
The North Carolina view that expert testimony is unnecessary when the
alleged negligent act does not involve special skill or judgment is consistent with
the views of other jurisdictions. 96 Although courts and commentators do not
always use the terms consistently, the distinction between "nursing negligence"
and "nursing malpractice" rests on the same test used to determine whether
expert testimony is necessary: that is, did the act involve professional skill or
judgment?97
If a nurse's acts are to be judged by a professional standard of care requir-
ing expert testimony at trial, who then is competent to testify? If, "through
study or experience, or both, the witness has acquired such skill that he is better
qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the particular subject of his testi-
90. Id. at 627, 205 S.E.2d at 348.
91. 69 N.C. App. 547, 317 S.E.2d 421 (1984).
92. Id. at 547-48, 317 S.E.2d at 422-23.
93. Defendant contended that the witness was not qualified to testify as an expert. Id. at 548,
317 S.E.2d at 422.
94. Id. at 549, 317 S.E.2d at 423.
95. Id. But see Page v. Wilson Memorial Hosp., Inc., 49 N.C. App. 533, 272 S.E.2d 8 (1980)
(directed verdict for defendant reversed because expert testimony of registered nurse should have
been admitted to establish customary standard in use of bedpan).
96. See, eg., Robbins v. Jewish Hosp., 663 S.W.2d 341, 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (expert testi-
mony to show deviation from standard of care unnecessary when nurse left side rail down and
patient recovering from drug overdose got out of bed and fell); Coursen v. New York Hosp.-Cornell
Medical Center, 114 A.D.2d 254, 257, 499 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (1986) (expert opinion on standard of
care unnecessary when nurses' aide allowed post-operative patient to use bathroom unescorted and
patient fainted and fell).
97. Morris, supra note 11, at 110-11. One court has noted:
[N]egligence rules are applicable in those situations where the issue relating to the exercise
of due care may be "easily discernible by a jury on common knowledge." ... However,
where the directions given or treatment received by a patient is in issue, this requires con-
sideration of the professional skill and knowledge of the practitioner or the medical facility
and the more specialized theory of medical malpractice applies.
Coursen v. New York Hosp.-Cornell Medical Center, 114 A.D.2d 254, 256, 499 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54
(1986) (quoting Morwin v. Albany Hosp., 7 A.D.2d 582, 585, 185 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (1959)).
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mony," then the witness is competent.98 The expert witness need not be li-
censed, or employed professionally or commercially in that field of expertise.99
Thus, physicians as well as nurses have been held qualified to testify regarding
the nursing standard of care.1° ° In testifying, however, the physician must re-
strict his or her opinion to the nursing standard of care, not a physician standard
of care. 10 '
Use of physician testimony to establish a nursing standard of care clearly is
acceptable in North Carolina, as in other jurisdictions.10 2 Whether this is an
optimal practice is another question. Physicians and nurses undergo different
training and approach problems from different perspectives.10 3 At least one stu-
dent commentator has found the practice of using physicians rather than nurses
to establish a nursing standard of care objectionable:
This [practice] would not be surprising if nurses were still functioning
as handmaidens of physicians, following their orders without in-
dependent thought. The status of nursing has changed, however, and
not only do physicians no longer have the special knowledge required
to testify in all cases of nursing malpractice, but their use as experts
may create problems that could be avoided by using nurses as experts
in most nursing malpractice cases.1 4
The inquiry should focus on whether the physician does indeed know the cus-
tomary practice of nurses regarding the procedure in question. Courts should
not assume knowledge, because nursing and medicine are two distinct disci-
plines, albeit with some overlapping functions.
In addition to expert testimony, written regulations, standards, and hospital
by-laws also are admissible as evidence of the accepted standard of care.105
98. Maloney v. Wake Hosp. Sys., Inc., 45 N.C. App. 172, 177, 262 S.E.2d 680, 683, disc. rev.
denied, 300 N.C. 375, 267 S.E.2d 676 (1980); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."). The corresponding North Carolina
rule is identical, except for the omission of the words "or otherwise" found at the end of the federal
rule. N.C. R. EVID. 702.
99. Maloney, 45 N.C. App. at 178, 262 S.E.2d at 684.
100. Paris, 75 N.C. App. at 380, 331 S.E.2d at 245 ("Physicians are clearly acceptable experts
with regard to the standard of care for nurses."); see also Haney v. Alexander, 71 N.C. App. 731,
735, 323 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1984) (within trial court's discretion to allow doctor to testify regarding
the duty of a nurse to take patient's vital signs when new or unusual symptoms exhibited), disc. rev.
denied, 313 N.C. 329, 327 S.E.2d 889 (1985).
101. Vassey v. Burch, 45 N.C. App. 222, 226, 262 S.E.2d 865, 867 (physician's affidavit stating
that accepted medical practice required checking patient for appendicitis was insufficient to with-
stand motion for summary judgment because it failed to establish proper standard of care for defend-
ant nurse), rev'd on other grounds, 301 N.C. 68, 269 S.E.2d 137 (1980).
102. See, e.g., Northern Trust Co. v. Skokie Valley Comm. Hosp., 81 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 401
N.E.2d 1246 (1980) (accepting such testimony of a physician as an expert on nursing practice);
Sandhofer v. Abbott-Northwestern Hosp., 283 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1979) (accepting the testimony of
a physician as an expert on nursing practice).
103. Comment, The Use of Nurses as Expert Witnesses, 19 Hous. L. REv. 555, 571 n.1 13 (1982).
104. Id. at 571.
105. See Taylor v. City of Beardstown, 491 N.E.2d 803, 811 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); see also Makas
v. Hillhaven, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 736, 742 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (nursing home patients' bill of rights
relevant to show patient's expectations for nursing home, but did not allow use of doctrine of negli-
gence per se).
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Standards of nursing practice have been established by organizations such as the
American Nurses' Association10 6 and the Joint Committee on Accreditation of
Hospitals.' 0 7 In addition, most hospitals have their own procedure manuals
outlining very specific behaviors for nurses. Such documentation of a standard
and proof of a breach of that standard is convincing evidence of malpractice. 108
Regulations from a hospital procedural manual presented an evidentiary
question for the Nevada Supreme Court in Wickliffe v. Sunrise Hospital, Inc. 109
when a patient stopped breathing after surgery, consequently suffering severe
brain damage and death. A nurse expert would have testified that the patient's
vital signs should have been taken every fifteen minutes for at least the first hour
after the patient returned to the surgical ward from the recovery room. 110 This
practice was consistent with the standards promulgated by the Joint Committee
on Accreditation of Hospitals. Because the patient's vital signs were not taken
every fifteen minutes, her respiratory depression was not discovered before she
quit breathing altogether. The trial court had excluded the nurse expert's testi-
mony entirely. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and held that her testi-
mony should have been admitted.1 11
Plaintiff in Wickliffe sought also to introduce a rolodex that contained por-
tions of the hospital's procedure manual. Part of the rolodex included the policy
that vital signs on postoperative patients should be taken every fifteen minutes
for an hour after surgery and more often if necessary. 112 The trial court limited
the testimony of a nursing supervisor, which would have laid the foundation for
admission of the rolodex, to matters of rebuttal. On remand, the supreme court
directed that the nursing supervisor be allowed to testify during the patient's
case-in-chief. 113
The question of what kinds of written regulations rise to the level of estab-
lishing a standard in North Carolina was addressed in Makas v. Hillhaven,
106. See, e.g., AM. NURSES' ASS'N DIV. ON MEDICAL-SURGICAL NURSING PRACTICE & EMER-
GENCY DEP'T NURSES' ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS OF EMERGENCY NURSING PRACTICE (1983);
AM. NURSES' ASS'N Div. O1 MATERNAL & CHILD NURSING PRACTICE, STANDARDS OF MATER-
NAL & CHILD HEALTH NURSING PRACTICE (1983). Standards promulgated by specialty nursing
associations also are available. See, eg., NURSES ASS'N OF THE AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS AND
GYNECOLOGY, STANDARDS FOR OBSTETRIC, GYNECOLOGIC, AND NEONATAL NURSING (3d ed.
1986).
107. JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOS-
PITALS 139-47 (1986).
108. See, e.g., Norris, 21 N.C. App. at 627, 205 S.E.2d at 348. The court's opinion in Norris
illustrates how harmful evidence of such a standard can be: "mhe jury could legitimately find that[plaintiff's] injury was a reasonably forseeable consequence of the failure of defendant's employee to
observe the very precautions set forth in defendant's own safety bulletin, which were clearly designed
to protect against the exact hazard which [plaintiff] encountered." Id. The Norris case is discussed
supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
109. 101 Nev. 542, 706 P.2d 1383 (1985).
110. Id. at 546, 706 P.2d at 1386.
111. The testimony was excluded on the basis of the witness' unfamiliarity with the local stan-
dard of care. The Nevada Supreme Court judicially adopted a national standard for hospital liabil-
ity. Id. at 546-47, 706 P.2d at 1386-87.
112. Id. at 549, 706 P.2d at 1388.
113. Id. at 550, 706 P.2d at 1388-89.
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l1.. 114 In Makas plaintiff alleged that defendant nursing home had acted negli-
gently in caring for plaintiff's decedent. Plaintiff offered no expert witnesses and
instead offered the Nursing Home Patients' Bill of Rights' 15 as the standard of
care. Plaintiff contended that "under the doctrine of negligence per se, she
needed only to offer evidence of a violation of the statute which proximately
caused injury to plaintiff." 116 The court held that, as a matter of law, the Pa-
tients' Bill of Rights did not establish the standard of care; to hold otherwise
would be to disregard section 90-21.12, North Carolina's statutory standard of
care for health care providers."17 Although the Patients' Bill of Rights might be
relevant in a negligence case to show patients' general expectations of a nursing
home, it could not be used to establish negligence per se." t8 The case law is
uniform in allowing such standards to be admitted as evidence of negligence, but
not as establishing negligence per se.
A particular problem in establishing the appropriate standard develops
when nurses who practice in expanded roles 1 9 and physicians perform overlap-
ping functions. When a physician testifies in a case involving such a nurse, it
often is unclear whether the physician expert witness is describing customary
practice for physicians, nurses, or both. When nurses practice in expanded
roles, such as nurse anesthetists, nurse midwives, and nurse practitioners, 120 one
would expect the nurse to be held to the standard of a reasonably prudent fellow
practitioner. The language of North Carolina's statutory standard, with the
phrase "similar training and experience,"' 21 points to that result. The standard
of care for nurses in specialized roles has not been discussed in the North Caro-
lina cases, although there are several cases in which nurse specialists have been
named as defendants. 122
114. 589 F. Supp. 736 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-117 (Supp. 1985) provides a policy statement and imposes re-
quirements for licensed nursing homes regarding the rights of nursing home patients.
116. Makas, 589 F. Supp. at 741.
117. Id. at 742.
118. Id.
119. For a general discussion of role expansion in nursing, see A. RHODES & R. MILLER, supra
note 1, at 101-02; Bullough, supra note 49, at 376-81.
120. For discussions relating to these expanded roles, see Comment, Nurse Practitioners: Here
Today... Gone Tommorrow?, 6 NOVA L.J. 365 (1982); Comment, The Legal Implications in Utiliz-
ing the Nurse Anesthetist in Place of the Anesthesiologist, 7 WHITrER L. REV. 855 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Comment, Legal Implications]; Note, Childbearing and Nurse-Midwives: A Woman's Right to
Choose, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661 (1983); Note, The Role of the Nurse Practitioner: Threatened After
Sermchief v. Gonzalez, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 493 (1984).
121. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1985). For the full text of this section, see supra text
accompanying note 13.
122. See, e.g., Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984) (standard of care
for family nurse practitioner not discussed because proximate causation not established), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985); Parks v. Perry, 68 N.C. App. 202, 314
S.E.2d 287 (physician used as expert witness, but unclear whether testifying regarding customary
practice for anesthesiologist or nurse anesthetist), disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 761, 321 S.E.2d 142
(1984); Bentley v. Langley, 39 N.C. App. 20, 249 S.E.2d 481 (affidavit of anesthesiologist sufficient to
oppose summary judgment, but conclusory statements contained therein regarding defendant's neg-
ligence failed to specify physician or nurse anesthetist standard of care), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C.
735, 254 S.E.2d 176 (1978); Starnes v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 28 N.C. App. 418, 221
S.E.2d 733 (1976) (issue was whether nurse anesthetist was responsible for maintaining infant's tem-
perature during surgery, not the appropriate standard of care).
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Other jurisdictions have considered the question of the standard of care for
nurses in specialized roles. In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group 123 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court found erroneous a jury instruction that read "the standard of
care required of a nurse practitioner is that of a physician and surgeon.., when
the nurse practitioner is examining a patient or making a diagnosis."1 24 The
court held that the proper standard was that of a reasonably prudent nurse prac-
titioner.1 2 5 An Illinois court took a different approach in Northern Trust Com-
pany v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hospital,126 holding that whether a nurse
working in a hospital nursery was to be held to a standard of care of a competent
nurse or to the standard of a nurse specially trained in the care of newborns was
a question for the jury.12 7 Thus, when a board of health regulation required a
specially trained nurse to supervise the nursery at all times, the jury was justified
in finding for defendant nurse by holding her to a competent but not specialized
nurse standard, yet finding against defendant hospital by holding the hospital
liable for failing to provide a specially trained nurse. 128
One commentator has criticized determining the standard of care by the
identity of the actor in areas of overlapping practice. "The standard of medical
care to which patients are entitled should not depend on the health care deliv-
erer. All patients should receive the same high-quality care, regardless of
whether the care is rendered by the anesthesiologist or nurse anesthetist."
129
This view, however, ignores the economic realities of our health care system and
is unfair to practitioners. Society has limited resources to expend on health care;
use of nurses in expanded roles helps to allocate those resources so that patients
in low-risk situations can receive less expensive health care. 130 Although nurse
specialists' and physicians' functions often overlap, their education and ap-
proach to problems is not identical. A practitioner, physician or nurse, who is
operating within the prerogatives of his or her license and delivering an accepta-
ble level of health care should not be subject to second-guessing by one who does
not approach and evaluate problems in the same context.
Nurses who practice outside the limitations of their licenses may be held to
the standard of the professional who is expected to perform the prohibited func-
tion. Thus, the Washington Supreme Court held a practical nurse to the stan-
dard of a registered nurse when she administered a polio booster shot to a child
and the needle broke off in the child's buttock. 131 A Washington state statute
required that registered nurses administer such injections. The court held that
123. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (en banc), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214
(1985).
124. Id. at 149-51, 695 P.2d at 673-74, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77.
125. Id. at 150, 695 P.2d at 674, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
126. 493 N.E.2d 6 (111. App. Ct. 1986).
127. Id. at 10.
128. Id.
129. Comment, Legal Implications, supra note 120, at 866.
130. See generally Kissam, Physician's Assistant and Nurse Practitioner Laws: A Study of Health
Law Reform, 24 U. KAN. L. REv. 1 (1975) (discussing the use of "allied" health personnel as a
means of expanding the supply of medical care and reducing its cost).
131. See Barber v. Reinking, 68 Wash. 2d 139, 411 P.2d 861 (1966).
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"one who undertakes to perform the services of a trained or graduate nurse must
have the knowledge and skill possessed by a licensed registered nurse.1 32 The
court further held that "the failure of [the nurse] to be so licensed raises an
inference that she did not possess the required knowledge and skill to administer
the inoculation in question."' 133
North Carolina courts apparently have not yet considered the issue of a
nurse practicing outside the scope of the nursing license. The practice of nursing
is regulated by mandatory licensure in North Carolina.134 Nursing is defined
under North Carolina's Nursing Practice Act 135 as follows:
"Nursing" is a dynamic discipline which includes the caring, counsel-
ing, teaching, referring and implementing of prescribed treatment in
the prevention and management of illness, injury, disability or the
achievement of a dignified death. It is ministering to; assisting; and
sustained, vigilant, and continuous care of those acutely or chronically
ill; supervising patients during convalescence and rehabilitation; the
supportive and restorative care given to maintain the optimum health
level of individuals and communities; the supervision, teaching, and
evaluation of those who perform or are preparing to perform these
functions; and the administration of nursing programs and nursing
services. 136
The North Carolina statutory provisions regarding nurse practitioners 137 and
midwives 133 are not included under the Nursing Practice Act.
It is evident from examining the statutory definition of nursing that its
terms are insufficiently specific to provide guidance on the issue of licensure
boundaries. Another statutory definition provides general categories of accepted
nursing practice for a registered nurse:
The "practice of nursing by a registered nurse" consists of the follow-
ing nine components:
a. Assessing the patient's physical and mental health, including the
patient's reaction to illnesses and treatment regimens;
b. Recording and reporting the results of the nursing assessment;
c. Planning, initiating, delivering, and evaluating appropriate nursing
acts;
d. Teaching, delegating to or supervising other personnel in imple-
menting the treatment regimen;
e. Collaborating with other health care providers in determining the
appropriate health care for a patient but, subject to the provisions of
G.S. 90-18.2, not prescribing a medical treatment regimen or making a
medical diagnosis, except under supervision of a licensed physician;
132. Id. at 143, 411 P.2d at 863.
133. Id.
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-171.19 (1985). See generally Bullough, supra note 49 (discussing the
history of American nursing licensure and practice acts).
135. N.C. GEN. STAr. §§ 90-171.19 to .47 (1985).
136. Id. § 90-171.20(4).
137. See id. § 90-18.2.
138. See id. §§ 90-178.1 to .7.
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f. Implementing the treatment and pharmaceutical regimen pre-
scribed by any person authorized by State law to prescribe such a
regimen;
g. Providing teaching and counseling about the patient's health care;
h. Reporting and recording the plan for care, nursing care given, and
the patient's response to that care; and
i. Supervising, teaching, and evaluating those who perform or are
preparing to perform nursing functions and nursing services. 13 9
Although the components listed are much more specific than the actions listed
in the definition of nursing, questions about the scope of nursing practice under
the Act inevitably arise. It would be impossible to define by statute all specific,
acceptable nursing functions, especially in light of the rapid advances being
made in medical technology. Thus, such questions as whether a registered nurse
can administer medication to patients in a venereal disease clinic on the basis of
standing orders in the absence of a physician and whether a registered nurse can
administer caudal analgesia (via a spinal needle) after placement of the needle by
a physician have arisen. In advisory opinions by the state attorney general, both
questions have been answered affirmatively,"140 although it would be difficult to
predict the answers from the statutory language. Cases such as Sermchief v.
Gonzales 141 illustrate the difficulties and interests at stake in drawing the line
between the practices of nursing and medicine. In Sermchief, a Missouri case,
nurses and physicians working in a nonprofit clinic providing obstetric and gy-
necologic services to lower-income patients sought a declaratory judgment and
injunction. Plaintiffs asked the court to declare that certain practices at the
clinic were authorized under the nursing laws of the state and did not constitute
the unlicensed practice of medicine.' 42 The Missouri Supreme Court, reversing
the lower court, held for plaintiffs-appellees. 4 3
Jurisdictions differ in holding nurses and physicians to the standard of a
professional in the same community, same or similar community, or the nation.
North Carolina judicially adopted a "same or similar community" standard in
Wiggins v. Piver 144 and the general assembly codified this standard in North
Carolina General Statutes section 90-21.12.145 The courts have not suggested
specific criteria for qualification as a "similar community"; indeed, research
reveals no reported cases in which one North Carolina community has been
considered insufficiently similar to another, so that expert testimony has been
disqualified. In Page v. Wilson Memorial Hospital, Inc. 146 the trial court ex-
139. Id. § 90-171.20(7).
140. See 50 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 9 (Sept. 12, 1980) (answering the question whether a nurse is
authorized to issue medication pursuant to a standing order in a venereal disease clinic); 49 Op. N.C.
Att'y Gen. 85 (Dec. 17, 1979) (answering the question whether a registered nurse is authorized to
administer caudal analgesia after placement of the needle by a physician).
141. 660 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
142. Id. at 684.
143. Id.
144. 276 N.C. 134, 171 S.E.2d 393 (1970).
145. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1985). For the full text of § 90-21.12, see supra text
accompanying note 13.
146. 49 N.C. App. 533, 272 S.E.2d 8 (1980).
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eluded a nurse's expert testimony on the basis that plaintiff had failed to produce
evidence that the communities with which the nurse was familiar were similar to
the community where the alleged act of negligence occurred. 147 The nurse ex-
pert was a registered nurse and had taught nursing students in Rocky Mount,
Williamston, Greenville, and Washington, North Carolina. The court of ap-
peals found the expert testimony admissible and granted a new trial, stating "we
suggest that nursing practices in connection with patients' use of a bedpan are so
routine and uncomplicated that the standard of care should not differ apprecia-
bly betweeen . . . Wilson and the neighboring counties of Nash and Pitt, or
nearby Martin County." 148
In Haney v. Alexander 149 the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated that
when the standard of care was the same nationwide, "an expert witness familiar
with that standard may testify despite his lack of familiarity with the defendant's
community."'150 The witness had stated that the standard for nurses taking vital
signs on a deteriorating patient was the same in accredited hospitals nation-
wide.15' The expert also testified that he was familiar with the standard of care
in communities similar to the one in question.15 2 Going even further than the
North Carolina Court of Appeals in Haney, the Nevada Supreme Court in
Wickliffe rejected the "locality rule" for hospital liability and adopted a national
standard. The court discussed the particular advisability of a national standard
for nursing practice in light of standardized nursing education and licensing ex-
aminations.153 Therefore, suits involving routine nursing functions could lead
to the routine application of a national standard, although it is unlikely that
attorneys will risk using experts unfamiliar with the standard of care in a similar
community.
As the nursing profession matures, nurses are moving into positions involv-
ing increasing responsibility and accountability. Legal liability inevitably fol-
lows. The current status of North Carolina law leaves the nurse vulnerable in
several areas, such as the right to use professional judgment in disobeying physi-
cians' orders, the routine and unquestioned use of doctors to establish a nursing
standard of care, and the question of what standard will be used to measure the
performance of nurses in expanded roles. In fairness to both nurses and their
patients, courts should place Byrd in its proper historical context and recognize
the right and duty of professionals nurses to exercise judgment in carrying out
physicians' orders. Courts should not automatically accept physicians as experts
on customary practice among professional nurses, but should allow them to tes-
tify as experts only if they are shown to be well acquainted with the customary
standard among nurses. Finally, nurse practitioners should be judged by the
147. Id. at 535, 272 S.E.2d at 10.
148. Id. at 536, 272 S.E.2d at 10.
149. 71 N.C. App. 731, 323 S.E.2d 430 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 329, 327 S.E.2d 889
(1985).
150. Id. at 736, 323 S.E.2d at 434.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Wickliffe, 101 Nev. at 546-47. 706 P.2d at 1386-87.
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standard of a reasonably prudent nurse practitioner when practicing within the
scope of their licenses. The net result would be accountability of professional
nurses for their expertise and education, yet protection from liability for a stan-
dard of care they have not assumed.
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